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The debate on whether financial cost should be a factor
in sentencing can be looked at from two angles, one
theoretical and the other pragmatic. The theoretical angle
examines whether the use of cost in sentencing can be
justified under any theory or theories of punishment. The
pragmatic angle looks at whether using cost in sentencing
actually makes any difference to how judges sentence, that
is, whether it will bring about any good results. In another
article, a companion to this shorter piece, I focus mainly
on the theoretical side.1 There, I argue that cost should
be treated as a disfavored factor in sentencing, because
there is no sound theoretical justification for it. If we
believe in retributivism, especially, it will be hard to see
how cost should figure in determining what punishment
the offender deserves (at least at the time of sentencing).
But even if we are not strict retributivists about sentencing,
it is hard to fit cost assessments into any of the traditional
justifications for punishment, including deterrence and
rehabilitation.
In this brief essay, I focus mainly on the pragmatic
side, asking about what goals adding cost as a sentencing
factor is supposed to achieve, and whether it will in fact
achieve those goals. I ask three questions in particular:
(1) Will including cost in the Missouri Sentencing Assessment Reports (SARs) actually change judicial behavior in
the ways supporters of the reform favor? (2) Will judges
use cost as a factor in a consistent and uniform way? and
(3) Are judges in the best position to make cost decisions
in sentencing, or should this be left to the legislature?
Some of these questions, especially the first, have a substantial empirical component. We cannot know, at least
without further time and study, whether including cost on
SARs will appreciably change judicial behavior. Nor will
we know whether judges will use cost in any predictably
uniform way until we have some data.
But the uncertainty on these empirical issues may
suggest ways in which the legislature is (ideally) superior
as the main agent of change for sentencing.2 Legislatures
can enact more sweeping reforms—reducing sentences
in one fell swoop rather than piecemeal—and they can
also do so more uniformly. There are also good reasons
why we might want to insulate judges, especially elected
judges, from having to decide issues of fiscal policy.

Elected judges might feel pressure to base decisions on
cost in tough budgetary times, which may mean they might
sentence less than they otherwise would. Alternatively,
judges who do decide (or are suspected of deciding)
based on cost might face greater popular opposition for
being too soft on criminals, by trying to save money at
the expense of public safety.
The motivation for including cost in sentencing is in
one way inarguable: sentences should at some level be
determined by taking into account all relevant information,
and sentences should be, broadly, “cost effective”: they
should achieve their goals at the lowest feasible cost. But it
is a separate question which institution—the legislature,
the executive branch, or the judiciary—should be making
decisions about cost. There are of course difficulties in
getting legislatures to act in ways that are cost effective,
especially when dealing with punishment. Still, things are
starting to change, and we might hope that sentencing
reform from the top down will happen, and happen sooner
rather than later. Sentencing commissions should push
legislatures to take this responsibility, and not, as is the
case with giving judges the power to make sentencing decisions, give the legislature a way to shirk that responsibility.
I. Will the Reform Make Any Difference?

Those who defend the change in the SAR (whom I’ll call,
simply, “reformers”) frequently make two claims. The
first claim tries to minimize the impact of the reform by
saying that cost is simply one more piece of information
that judges might consider and that they could just as
easily ignore.3 What, then, is the harm in including that
additional information?
The second claim some reformers make is more ambitious, which is that allowing judges to figure cost in their
sentencing decisions will push judges to imprison less,
and by the same token, reduce the overall price to the
state of punishing criminals. At least, this is the hope in
financially stressed times: prison is expensive, and alternatives to prison are not only cheaper, they may also be a
lot better (or as good) at reducing crime. But the second
claim stands in some tension with the first, because for
reform actually to save the state money, cost must not
only be one more piece of information for judges to
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consider, it must also move some judges to choose the
less expensive punishment who wouldn’t have otherwise
chosen it.
Will judges actually use the cost data that is now
available to them? The assumption that judges make cost
assessments already is one that needs to be tested empirically. The fact that judges may consider such things as
general or specific deterrence doesn’t automatically mean
that they are considering such things as fiscal impact
when they pass down sentences. The goal of saving money
seems to be a different kind of goal than the traditional
penological ones of preventing, deterring, and justly punishing crime.
But the new SAR might have a dynamic effect: it might
prompt some judges who otherwise wouldn’t think about
the cost of a sentence to think about it. Whether it has this
effect will be determined, in part, by whether judges will
see the making of cost as an explicit factor as either ratifying past practice or representing a new (and possibly
unwarranted) departure from it. Certainly judges might
feel emboldened to consider cost now that they have specific (and putatively credible) numbers on the price of
individual sentences, numbers that come with the imprimatur of the Missouri Sentencing Commission. But other
judges might be adamant in not using cost, saying that
this would be a violation of their duty to sentence based on
desert and other traditional punishment rationales, and
not on factors exogenous to punishment, such as cost.
Indeed, some judges have already said so.4
There are also different possibilities in how judges will
end up using cost as a sentencing factor. Some judges
might set out, explicitly, the lower cost of probation as a
reason for giving someone probation rather than a prison
term. Other judges might not factor cost explicitly, but the
presence of cost listed on the SAR might work on them
unconsciously. They may even deny that they are using
cost to decide a sentence, or that they looked at the costs of
sentences at all, but it may factor in their decisions nonetheless. (This, incidentally, might make it hard to measure
what work the reform is doing.)
For the reform to be effective, something like the
above possibilities has to happen—that is, judges have to
explicitly or implicitly start using cost in making sentencing decisions. Moreover, in at least some cases, cost has
to be not only a considered factor but a deciding one. As I
mentioned earlier, some defenders of the reform have
said that including cost simply means that judges simply
have more information; this is undoubtedly true. But for
the reform to lead to different sentences, or to lower costing sentences, the information must be doing some work
in changing judges’ minds about what sentence to give.
That is, it has to be possible that a judge who might otherwise decide on a longer sentence will decide on a shorter
sentence, or probation over prison, because that sentence
costs less. Otherwise, putting cost on the SAR will simply
add an extra wheel that does no part in moving the sentencing machinery.

In this regard, we might worry that those judges who
are inclined to let cost figure in a sentencing decision are
those who are already predisposed to give lighter sentences or to favor alternatives to prison. This may be either
because they already included the cost of a sentence in
deciding how to sentence, or because they were going to
give the lighter or alternative sentence anyway and the cost
simply offered no barrier to doing so (and indeed may
even have confirmed their initial judgment). If most
judges who are inclined to consider cost are like this, then
the point of the reform from a pragmatic point of view will
have been missed, because it will not change judicial
behavior, or at least not enough judicial behavior to make
any fiscal difference.
Or consider another possibility. Perhaps those cases
where the cost savings would be the greatest are those
cases where judges will be least likely to let cost make a
difference. More serious crimes, such as murder or armed
robbery, would probably fall into this category. For a judge
sentencing in such a case, the idea that the cheaper sentence
should win out because it is cheaper will seem anathema.5
This could be another way in which cost will only do at
best minimal work, because in the most serious cases,
cases where the price difference between many years in
prison and many years on probation is great, cost will be
bracketed. Only time and further study will tell if this is
what happens. But there seem to be some plausible reasons to doubt that the reform will have any but a modest
impact on reducing the cost of sentences, or in making
sentencing more cost effective.
II. Will Judges Use the Numbers Consistently?6

But suppose that at least some judges do use the numbers.
If they do, we might have another reason to worry: judges
may use the numbers differently, which will lead to disparities in sentencing. There are several ways in which
judges might differently factor cost into a sentencing decision. I want to explain how variations based on cost could
occur before going on to explain why I think variation in
sentencing based on cost is problematic.7
First, there might be a lack of consistency in who uses
the numbers. Maybe when cost is listed as a sentencing
factor, all judges will use it in their sentencing decisions.
Then again, maybe only some will. Some judges might
take a principled stand against using cost in sentencing,
and so ignore the numbers on the SAR. Other judges
might gladly use the cost figures (these may be the judges
who had always, in a rough way, used cost as a factor in
considering the proper sentence). Still others might
slowly warm to the idea of using cost. In any event, there
is no reason to believe that all judges across the board
will use cost to determine the right sentence. The more
likely possibility is that some judges will use cost and
some won’t.
Second, even among the judges who do consider cost,
there might be differences in the way they use it. Some
may use it in every type of case; others may use it only in
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minor nonviolent offenses. Some judges may weigh cost
very heavily in deciding an appropriate sentence; others
may have cost enter in only at the margins, that is, in a
way that would rarely be decisive. So we might have a further variation among those judges who use sentencing
numbers, both in terms of what cases they use the numbers to decide and how heavily they weigh cost when they
do use it as a sentencing factor. We could imagine there
being profound variation in the ways judges use cost;
some may use it aggressively, others may use it rarely,
if at all.
Third, even one judge across time might not be consistent in how he or she considers cost. A judge may on some
days consider cost very heavily (perhaps unconsciously in
response to news about the state’s dire fiscal straits!) but
on other days be less inclined to have cost make any difference to who gets what sentence. Or again, he or she may
use cost only in minor cases, and ignore cost altogether
when it comes to violent offenses or serious property
crimes. So even if we take one judge across time, that
judge might use cost differently.
There is, then, some reason to believe that how cost is
used will vary between judges and even in the same judge.
But why should this sort of inconsistency matter? After all,
when presented with any information—the offender’s
past history, or even the nature of the offender’s crime—
different judges will come to different determinations of
how that factor should cut, and how far it should cut. That
is in some way the beauty of a system that allows judicial
discretion: judges are allowed to use their judgment as to
how to assess different factors in sentencing, and how to
weigh them in deciding what punishment is appropriate.
Unless we eliminate judicial discretion entirely, we have
to accept the fact that different judges may sentence differently, even when presented with roughly similar crimes
and criminals.8
But cost might be different than other sentencing factors. Cost is not usually considered to be a paradigmatic
sentencing factor, or even a permissible one, certainly not
under the federal sentencing guidelines.9 It is easy to see
why. Cost, considered solely as the financial cost of a punishment, is largely exogenous to the traditional rationales
for punishing people: rehabilitation, deterrence, and especially retribution.10 It is a factor that is more familiar in
legislative budgetary conversations than in punishment
theory. Surely the burden should be on defenders of the
reform to explain why it should be relevant in deciding
how much, or in what way, to punish offenders. Why
should the cost of a sentence, of all things, be capable of
tipping the balance in favor of one sentence rather than
another?
Imagine a prisoner who is sentenced to a longer prison
term than another solely because one judge took cost into
account and his judge did not. That is, one judge considered the cost of the sentence, and the other didn’t, and
it is on that basis alone that the two sentences diverge—
not because one crime was worse than another, or because
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one criminal was a less likely candidate for rehabilitation.11
Doesn’t the prisoner with the higher sentence have not
just a complaint, but a legitimate complaint? It is one thing
to explain to a prisoner that his judge is less generous
in believing offenders can be rehabilitated and that is why
he has a longer sentence. It is another thing, I think, to
explain to a prisoner that the reason why he has a longer
sentence is that his judge is not as zealous a cost cutter as
other judges. If cost cutting is a concern, it should apply
in a way that is uniform across all sentencing decisions:
it is not something that should be left to the discretion of
judges, who may use cost differently, or not at all.
And the larger the difference in sentences between
similarly situated offenders (when the difference is based
on cost), the greater force the claim of unfairness has. If,
to take an extreme case, one offender is given probation
and the other is sentenced to prison only because one
judge likes cheaper sentences, then the offender facing
prison has a good moral if not legal case that his sentence
is unfair vis-à-vis the other offender. By including cost as
a sentencing factor, we invite this type of rather arbitrary
and unfair treatment.
Uniformity in sentencing is not the highest good, of
course. We might want to tolerate some deviations from
uniformity if this at least means some offenders get lower
penalties (with the idea that sentences in general are too
high). I might be open to such a pragmatic argument,
especially given the overlong sentences for many crimes
in the status quo.12 If we can reduce the harshness of a
sentence in one instance, why does it matter that it does
not extend to all equally situated offenders? But we should
not be blind to the possibility of unfairness, especially
when it is unfairness due to something outside of the
usual reasons why we punish. Certainly we would not
accept such a pragmatic argument for a lower sentence if
one of the reasons the judge decided for a lower sentence
was because the offender was white! Cost is not race, certainly, but it is a factor that, like race, is unrelated to the
traditional purposes of punishment. For this reason, the
unfairness that using cost might engender should make
us wary of decisions reached on that basis.
III. Are Judges Best Situated to Make Reforms
Based on Cost?

To the previous two sections, the response of the reformer
might be to say, simply: What’s the real harm in including
information about cost on SARs? The reformer might concede that, yes, it is unlikely that many judges will take the
new information into account when sentencing. Perhaps
not many judges will be moved to consider cost, because of
their understanding of the judicial role. Perhaps the cases
where the greatest cost savings could be achieved—several
years probation rather than several years in jail—will be the
ones where judges will be least likely to let cost be determinative. Perhaps the cost savings even where a judge is
moved to base his or her decision on costs will be merely a
blip on the state’s overall financial picture. All of this the
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reformer may concede, and then use the concession to his
advantage. For then the reformer may say, what’s the big
deal? Some judges may use cost, and this may save the
state some money. If it does not save money, then there is
really no harm done.
I have already highlighted one potential problem with
the use of cost, a problem that exists even if cost is used
only rarely: sentences will be different for an almost arbitrary reason, and this is unfair. I think this is a real harm,
however small, but again the reformer may claim that it is,
at best, de minimis. Given the unfairness at all stages of the
criminal justice system (who gets caught, who gets charged,
who is found guilty), this is surely at the minor end of the
scale, something we should not worry too much about.
But even if cost is used only rarely and even if the unfairness that may result is minor and not too pervasive, I still
think that judges using cost is a bad idea. Putting the onus
on judges to reduce cost may distract from the main place
where cost cutting can occur, and tough decisions about
the cost of sentences should be made, viz., the legislature.
Indeed, putting judges in the position of cost cutters could
have backlash effects of a pernicious sort, especially in a
state like Missouri that elects many of its trial judges, and
where all judges are subject to retention elections.13 Judges
may be pressured to use cost as a sentencing factor, if citizens demand financial accountability in addition to
judicial accountability from their judges. Here, the risk is
not that cost will be used to tip the balance in favor of a
sentence, but may drive the sentencing decision, to the
exclusion of other traditional sentencing factors.
Or the incentives might work, even more perniciously,
in the other direction. One could imagine all sorts of
Willie Horton–inspired ads against the judge who gave a
criminal probation because it saved the state a couple of
thousand dollars, and the criminal went on to reoffend.
I think we have good reason to try to insulate judges from
this type of pressure, by not encouraging them to use cost
as a sentencing factor, which is what the new SARs tacitly
do.14 We normally don’t want judges to act like politicians,
or to be subject to the same pressures that politicians are
subject to, to pander to what people want.15 Asking judges
to make budgetary decisions in sentencing is just another
way of asking them to be politicians: it asks them to try to
save money for the state. It does not merely ask them to
do justice.
But the institutional point goes further than this. If the
goal of letting judges consider costs is to make a dent in
criminal justice system spending, then doing it piecemeal,
on the retail level, is inefficient. Better to do it wholesale:
reduce sentences across the board, rather than leaving it to
the chance, individual decisions of judges. And not only is
the legislature better suited to make the kind of sweeping
changes that would actually reduce costs in sentencing
in a real and perceptible way, it is also better situated to
do so fairly.16 Legislatures can set reduced or alternative
sentences uniformly, and so eliminate the unfairness that
can come with judges sometimes deciding to use cost to

reduce sentences and sometimes not. Having judges
determine costs has the wrong institution pursuing what
is undoubtedly a worthy social goal.
It may be that the reform to the SARs was borne out of
frustration with the Missouri legislature’s failure to take
criminal justice reform seriously. And on this level, the
Sentencing Commission cannot be faulted. There is a lot
to be frustrated about in Missouri’s system of criminal
justice. And the recurring threats to abolish the Missouri
Sentencing Commission are certainly wrongheaded. The
Commission is right to highlight the problems facing the
criminal justice system, and the increasing cost of punishment has a good claim to be problem number one. But
it is an open question (in part, an open empirical question) whether letting judges use cost as a sentencing
factor is the best way to go about trying to reduce the cost
of criminal justice, and whether it will cause more harm
than good.
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